EXPLANATION, HUMAN NATURE,
AND TORT THEORY

Jeffery L. Johnson
Philosophy, Politics, & Economics
Eastern Oregon University

EXPLANATION, HUMAN NATURE,
AND TORT THEORY
I.
[T]he kind of conceptual explanation of tort law that
economic analysis offers is deeply inadequate, in a
way that becomes clear when we consider the sort of
explanation offered by the principle of corrective
justice … That principle states that individuals who

are responsible for wrongful losses of others have a
duty to repair those losses. … Corrective justice can

provide an account of what tort law is, in a way that
economic analysis fails to do.1
This

quote

from

Jules

Coleman

nicely embodies

two

prevailing

assumptions in contemporary tort theory. The first is that jurisprudence and the
philosophy of law are largely explanatory enterprises. And the second is that the
two dominant theories of torts – law and economics and corrective justice – are
doing conceptual battle, so that if one view is true, the other must be false.
I have no quarrel with the first assumption; indeed, I see it as a very
positive methodological advance in our understanding of the purpose of
jurisprudence.

Good philosophical analysis has always been, at its heart,

explanatory. We are confused, puzzled, or just intrigued, by some feature of the
world, and the philosopher’s words help us better understand it. Recent work in
jurisprudence and philosophy of law has explicitly recognized the explanatory
underpinnings of both general theories of law, and of specific areas of the law
such as torts. All of this is extremely healthy because our understanding of the

1

nature of explanation itself has increased a good deal in the last half century,
particularly in the philosophy of science.2
The second assumption, however, is much more complicated.

I am

generally sympathetic to the reservations often presented by critics of the law
and economics approach to legal questions. I am also predisposed to endorse
the deeply normative implications that I see, though Coleman does not, at the
heart of corrective justice accounts of private law. All of this being said, though,
it proves remarkably difficult to find articulations of these two views of tort law
that explicitly contradict one another. In fact, in many cases the most vociferous
advocates of one theory concede the truth in the other’s account, though
relegating it to minor conceptual importance. I will argue that the most straightforward, perhaps the only, way to present the two schools of torts as logically
incompatible is to carry our jurisprudential investigations clear to the level of
basic human nature.
II.
[C]orrective justice … purports to explain tort law in a
non-reductive way, by identifying the principle that
ties together its central concepts and explains the
practical inferences they warrant. Tort law is itself a
scheme of practical reason. Typically, the plaintiff
has the burden of presenting evidence and argument
to support various allegations—among them, typically
she was harmed in a way the law ordinarily protects,
that the defendant breached a duty the he had
toward the plaintiff; and that in breaching the duty,
the defendant caused the plaintiff’s harm attributable
to the defendant as his doing.3
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Coleman sees his project as one of “conceptual explanation.” He is quite
methodologically sophisticated and candid in his defense of a “pragmatic
method” for conceptual analysis,4 but his general goal of unpacking the
“analytical core” of an important social practice has been a staple of western
philosophy since Socrates and his interlocutors discussed the “meaning” of
justice, knowledge, piety, and the like in Plato’s dialogues. Tort law is obviously
a social practice of great interest and importance, so an improved understanding
of its analytical core seems an entirely worthwhile intellectual project.
Consider as a start the way the state of California “defines” a tort.
A civil wrong, wherein one person’s conduct causes a
compensable injury to the person, property, or
recognized interest of another, in violation of a duty
imposed by law.5
The law professor may lament that “this does not tell us very much,”6 but the
philosopher can appreciate the elegance of the definition. A good pragmatist like
Coleman can further highlight how definitions such as this bring together in a
helpful way other central legal and moral concepts.
[T]ort law is best explained by corrective justice. The
central concepts of tort law—harm, cause, repair,
fault, and the like—hang together in a set of
inferential relations that reflect a principle of
corrective justice. This principle is thus embodied in
and explains tort law, and tort law, in turn, articulates
that principle and makes its requirements explicit.7
The structural element of torts that Coleman most famously emphasizes is
the “bilateral” nature of tort litigation.
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Tort law’s structural core is represented by case-bycase adjudication in which particular victims seek
redress for certain losses from those whom they claim
are responsible. In the event that a victim’s claim to
recovery is vindicated, her right to recover takes the
from of a judgment against the defendant … Any
plausible account of tort law must explain why claims
are taken up on a case-by-case fashion. A plausible
account must also explain the bilateral nature of
litigation.8
Ernest Weinrib goes so far as to suggest that tort liability, and more generally
private law liability, exhibits a unique normative structure because of the
phenomenon of bilaterality.
The most striking feature of private law is that it
directly connects two particular parties through the
phenomenon of liability. Both procedure and doctrine
express this connection. Procedurally, litigation in
private law takes the form of a claim that a particular
plaintiff presses against a particular defendant.
Doctrinally, requirements such as the causation of
harm attest to the dependence of the plaintiff’s claim
on a wrong suffered at the defendant’s hand. In
singling out these two parties and bringing them
together in this way, private law looks to neither the
litigants individually nor to the interests of the
community as a whole, but to the bipolar relationship
of liability.9
In the much older vocabulary in which conceptual analysis was conducted
in the last century, both what Coleman calls the “case by case” adjudication, and
the phenomenon “biltererality” or “bipolorality,” seem to be logically necessary
conditions for a tort.

If theories of torts are intended to provide quasi-

descriptive conceptual accounts of what is involved whenever there is a legal
tort, then it certain counts hugely in favor of the corrective justice models that

4

they so nicely include these features. At the same time, it is a serious liability for
economic accounts of torts, since they are entirely silent about these necessary
conceptual ingredients.
The problem that confronts economic analysis, or any
entirely forward-looking theory of tort law, is that it
seems to ignore the point that litigants are brought
together in a case because one alleges that the other
has harmed her in a way that she had no right to do.
Litigants do not come to court in order to provide the
judge with an opportunity to pursue or refine his
vision of optimal risk reduction. Rather they seek to
have their claims vindicated: to secure an official
pronouncement concerning who had the right to do
what to whom. The judge is there, in some sense to
serve them—to do justice between them; they are not
there to serve the judge in his policy-making capacity.
… Under economic analysis the litigants to a tort suit
bear no normatively significant relationship to one
another, or in any case, do not do so in any
fundamental way.10
But things surely couldn’t be quite as simple as this. Why would there continue
to be any scholarly controversy at all?

Any economic lawyer would have to

concede that case-by-case adjudication and bilaterality are parts of the essential
nature of our concept of tort law.
III.
Assume with Aristotle that the purpose of tort law is
to do “corrective justice,” that is, to restore to a
person what has been wrongly taken from him rather
than to improve the allocation of resources. It would
still be necessary to inquire into the source of the
norms on the basis of which certain conduct is
deemed wrongful. The source might be economic.
Efforts have been made to explain ethical concepts,
including the sense of being wronged, in economic (or
closely related biological) terms.
It would be
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consistent with these efforts to find that the tort
concept of fault has an economic rationale also.11
What are we to make statements like the above from Landis and Posner?
Two of most accomplished economic lawyers seem willing to grant that
corrective justice models of torts capture something essential in this central legal
practice. They insist, of course, that something deeply economic is required for
an adequate understanding of torts, but they seem not at all troubled by
characteristics like the essential bilaterality of tort litigation. It seems as though
the economist is explaining something altogether different than the conceptual
structure of a tort action.
Landis and Posner remain concerned with questions of resource
allocation, though they are willing to concede that this issue is not part of the
meaning of a tort.
[T]he common law of torts is best explained as if the
judges who created the law through decisions
operating as precedents in later cases were trying to
promote efficient resource allocation.12
According to the economist, what allows appeals courts judges’ decisions to
further the social goal of efficient resource allocation is that the common law
rules created in these decisions work to bring this about.
Since the early 1970s a number of studies have
appeared that apply economic theory to the common
law – the body of English and American judge-made
rules, may of great antiquity, governing torts (civil
wrongs that result in personal injury or property
damage), contracts, property, crimes, and many other
fields of private conduct. Surprisingly, many of these
studies find that common law rules can best be
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explained as if they were designed to increase
economic efficiency.13
One is almost tempted to say that the corrective justice theorists and the
economic lawyers are simply talking past one another. Coleman, Weinrib, and
their colleagues are attempting to map out the conceptual ingredients, the
meaning if you will, of tort law.

Posner, Landis, and their colleagues are

engaged in an entirely different project, exploring the economic structure and
benefits to current tort law rules.

But if this is really the case, why do the

principles see themselves as engaged in philosophical battle?

We must step

back for a bit, and explore more generally what is involved in offering an
explanation, whether of a concept, legal practice, scientific phenomenon, or day
to day occurrence.
VI.
To explain the phenomena in the world of our
experience, to answer the question of “Why?” rather
than only the question of “What?”, is one of the
foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and
especially, scientific research in its various branches
strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject
matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena
it investigates.”14
Philosophers of science have long been preoccupied with the nature of
(scientific) explanations. One very general, but still viable, theory treats them as
answers to “why-questions.” This view of explanation is helpful in understanding
the activities of not just the natural scientist (“Why is the light from distant
galaxies shifted to the red end of the spectrum?”), but also the historian (“Why
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did Europe go to war in 1914?”), the literary critic (“Why does Hamlet
procrastinate?”), and the tort theorist (“Why did the court rule for the dock
owner in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.?”). Much of the work in many
academic disciplines is the production of explanations or detailed answers to

why-questions.
For most of us of a non-post-modern bent, we are also interested in the

right, correct, true, or best explanation. Theoreticians in the specific disciplines
have had much to say about constitutes the best scientific, historical, etc.,
explanation. If we generalize, however, I believe we are left with very broad
accounts that, though abstract, are still useful.
There is, of course, a problem about how one is to
judge that one hypothesis is sufficiently better than
another hypothesis. Presumably such a judgment will
be based on considerations such as which hypothesis
is simpler, which is more plausible, which explains
more, which is less ad hoc, and so forth.15
And even more insightfully:
the only very general thing we can say about what we
do when we evaluate evidence is rather coarsegrained. When we do prefer one member of the list of
rivals to the others, we do so simply because it
comports best with the data we have, against the
background of our relevant knowledge. Some rivals
score better in some ways, others in others. We
weigh the tugs in all directions and judge one rival to
‘fit’ better than the others, all things considered. . . .
So at bottom it is always a complex judgment of fit:
which one fits most easily with everything we know
about the matter.16
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The notion of the best explanation is deeply ambiguous.

When

confronted with a list of possible explanations for some occurrence we may
prefer one for a number of very different reasons.
•

It is the clearest.

•

It gets at the heart of the matter.

•

It calls attention to factors easily overlooked.

•

It is the cutest.

•

It is the most plausible.

•

It is the only one on the list that is accurate.

•

It is true.

•

Et cetera.

It is easy to imagine circumstances where one candidate was the clearest,
another the most insightful, yet another the cutest, and all of them are “true.”
Consider a bit of office gossip. Our colleague, Jane, was asked out for a
dinner date last week.

Although it is none of our business, we can’t help

ourselves, and we shameless speculate as to why she accepted the invitation.
We manage to assemble quite a list of explanatory candidates.
E1.

Dick is tall, dark, and handsome.

E2.

Jane broke up with her long time boyfriend a
couple of months ago.

E3.

Jane has had a crush on Dick since junior high.

E4.

Jane was charmed by the humble, almost shy,
way in which Dick asked her.
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E5.

Dick uttered the words, “would you like to
have dinner with me on Saturday?” with the
intention of mak[ing] a social engagement
Jane so understood Dick’s
with, Jane.
utterance and responded, “I’d love to,”
because she was also desirous of a social
engagement.17

E6.

Jane’s central nervous system was in the
complicated state XYZ at the time of Dick’s call.

It is certainly possible that one of these explanations is perceived to be false, and
that another is being proposed in its place. Say Betty is confused about Jane’s
history, and Michael corrects her. “No, no, that wasn’t the guy she had a crush
in junior high, in fact she never met Dick before last year’s Christmas party. She
said yes because she was charmed by the sweet way that he phrased the
invitation.” In such a circumstance, E4 is being proposed as a rival to E3. But as
the hypotheses are stated in our list, they could all be simultaneously true.
There still could be debate, even if they are all true, about whether one or
the other is better. Perhaps Dorothy thinks that Carl’s observation about Dick’s
looks really misses the point since Jane generally doesn’t care about those
things, but is convinced that Jane has really wanted a chance to go out ever
since the breakup. Unless our office is a neuroscience laboratory, probably none
of us care very much what Jane’s neurological state was. And, unless we are
lexicographers, the conceptual explanation about the meaning of a date, is
probably not that important either.
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VII.
[T]he dominant function of the fault system is to
generate rules of liability that if followed will bring
about, at least approximately, the efficient – cost
justified – level of accidents and safety.18
Let us take economic lawyers at their word. Richard Posner says nothing
about proposing a conceptual model of torts, but rather a hypothesis about the
function of the central liability rule in contemporary tort law.

Treating the

economic analysis of torts as a functional explanation seems much truer to the
economic lawyer’s project, and also nicely explains why the corrective justice
theorists seem at times to be talking right past the economists.

Functional

explanations have been the subject of a good deal of philosophical reflection in
the past half century, and much of that work will prove useful in assessing the
economic lawyer’s proposal.
Jules Coleman is open to the possibility that Posner and his colleagues are
indeed offering functional accounts of torts and tort rules.
Rather than seeking to reduce to economic terms the
concepts that figure in tort law, this approach appeals
to its supposed economic function as part of a causal
explanation of the existence and shape of tort law.
The best-known successful examples of functional
explanations of this sort are found in evolutionary
biology, in which natural selection and other
evolutionary pressures are proposed as mechanisms
that provide a causal link between a purpose or
function and a biological trait that is said to serve that
function. The problem here … is that economic
analysis fails to satisfy the requirements of a formally
adequate functional explanation of this kind.19
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Coleman’s discussion of the functional treatment of torts is a perplexing mixture
of, at times, insightful philosophical analysis, and at other times, almost
conceptual blindness.
Let us begin our investigation of all of this tricky theoretical terrain with a
model of what a functional explanation ultimately is. The philosopher of science,
Larry Wright, proposed a textbook example of what Coleman called in the
jurisprudential context, a “conceptual explanation” for functions.
The function of X is Z iff:
(i)
Z is a consequence (result) of X’s being
there,
(ii)
X is there because it does (results in) Z20
Wright calls the central structure of this model a “consequence etiology” because
the existence of the entity having the consequence – the result, function, or goal
– is causally explained by the very fact that the entity tends to have this
consequence.

This structure is remarkably robust, since it covers both goal-

directed accounts of behavior, “the rabbit is running in order to escape the dog,”
and functional accounts, “the function of the heart is to pump blood,” as well as
teleological explanations that candidly appeal to conscious intent and design,
“the function of this switch is to adjust the volume,” and those where
consciousness and agency are completely absent, “the function of the leopard’s
spots are camouflage.”
If we import Posner’s functional hypothesis into Wright’s model we get the
following.
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The [dominant] function of the fault system is [the]

generation rules of liability that if followed will bring
about, at least approximately, the efficient – cost
justified – level of accidents and safety iff:
(i)
[the] generation rules of liability that if
followed will bring about, at least
approximately, the efficient – cost justified
– level of accidents and safety is a
consequence (result) of the fault system’s
being there,

(ii)

the fault system is there because it does
(results in) the efficient – cost justified –
level of accidents and safety .

We are provisionally granting the empirical claims made in necessary condition
(i). What is of central concern is the consequence-etiology account of how the
proposed function came to be there in necessary condition (ii).
Coleman correctly notes that:
[o]f course, the simple fact that some practice P has
outcome X cannot warrant the claim that X is the
reason why P exists, explains P, or is P’s purpose or
function.21
The nose beautifully supports eyeglasses, but it would be ludicrous to suppose
that the function of the nose is to support eyeglasses. The consequence-etiology
demands a plausible causal account of how the entity, behavior, or practice
came to be there.
Coleman quite reasonably rejects one account, though an account never
really offered by economic lawyers.
The most straightforward sense in which an outcome
can be called the function of practice is the case
where the practice is intended by its designers or
participants to produce the outcome. This kind of
explanation is not “functional” in the sense we are

13

now considering, because the function enters into the
explanation only in so far as it is the aim or goal of
some intentional agent. Clearly this cannot be the
nature of the economic explanation, since no one
wishes to claim that the many individuals who
contributed over the centuries to the development of
our tort institutions were aiming at economic
efficiency.22
Depending on whose history we are reading, economic considerations first
entered jurisprudence with Holmes,23 Learned Hand,24 or Coase and Calabresi.25
But at it’s earliest, this is long after the changes in common law rules that are
being postulated as having the function of increasing efficiency. Whatever else
is going on, it is not a conscious movement among judges and academic
lawyers.
Short of a thoroughly Darwinian account, Coleman sees no alternative to
the intentional account of functionality.
The challenge to the economic analysis should now
be apparent.
It begins by rejecting the selfunderstandings of the developers and participants in
the practice, and in so doing it rejects the strategy of
offering an intentional explanation.
Yet typical
economic analysis of tort law (or of any other body of
law, for that matter) offers no causal mechanism
either—no analogue of random mutation and natural
selection. It appears to remain at the level of a JustSo-Story.26
Just-So-Stories have bad press in contemporary evolutionary theory.

The

standard argument is that it is too easy to simply speculate about the adaptive
value of some structural or behavioral feature, but if the biologist cannot offer
evidence for its specific evolutionary history, that hypothesis remains entirely
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speculative.

As stated, though, this objection shows a very narrow view of

science. Lots of the most interesting and important theories started out as JustSo-Stories – purely theoretical accounts, with little causal detail or empirical
evidence. The economic account would be worthy of our attention even if it is,
at this stage of our understanding, merely theoretical.

But as I shall argue,

Posner and his colleagues have offered a fairly detailed causal account.
VIII.
People who say that judges are not economists are
sometimes confused about the meaning of
economics. If economics were limited to explicitly
economic phenomena such as monopoly and inflation,
it would be indeed odd to describe a judge deciding
an accident case as engaged in economic reasoning.
But if economics is defined as the science of rational
choice or (equivalently) as the attempt to get the
most from scarce resources, it becomes natural to
conceive of a judge in an accident case as trying to
ascertain whether the injurer and the victim were
behaving carefully in the sense of trying to minimize
the sum of expected-accident and accident-avoidance
costs. Of course the judge will not use these words
(even to himself) to describe what he is doing; but
the vocabulary of economics is designed for the use
of scholars, not judges.27
The economic lawyer’s causal account of the function of tort rules begins
with a notorious theory of basic human nature.

Consider Posner’s

characterization of economic behavior, and the behavior of the judges whose
decisions shape the course of tort law.
The basic assumption of economics that guides the
version of economic analysis of law that I shall be
presenting is that people are rational maximizers of
their satisfactions—all people (with the exception of
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small children and the profoundly retarded) in all of
their activities (except when under the influence of
psychosis or similarly deranged through drug or
alcohol abuse) that involve choice.28
The hypothesis of economic rationality is offered here as an empirical
explanation of human behavior. Obviously, if this hypothesis proves “false,” if a
better explanation of human behavior is discovered, then the economic analysis
of law, or anything else for that matter, becomes uninteresting to the point of
moot.

Let us grant the economist her assumption, at least for the present

purposes.
Now since judges, particularly appeals court justices, are taken to be
economically rational, and because their job obviously involves choice, it follows
almost deductively, that their basic human nature (homo economus) will play a
central role in the decisions they reach, and in a common law system, the law
that they fashion.
The judges thus have a dual role: to interpret
interest-group deals embodied in legislation and to
provide the basic public service of authoritative
dispute resolution. They perform the latter function
not only by deciding cases in accordance with
preexisting norms, but also—especially in the AngloAmerican legal system—by elaborating those norms.
They fashioned the common law out of customary
practices, out of ideas borrowed from statutes and
other legal systems (for example, Roman law), and
out of their own conceptions of public policy. The law
they created exhibits, according to the economic
theory that I am expounding, a remarkable (though
not total …) substantive consistency. It is as if the
judges wanted to adopt rules, procedures, and case
outcomes that would maximize society’s wealth.29
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Granting these empirical – psychological, perhaps biological – assumptions about
what make people tick, I don’t see how anyone can deny that the economist’s
analysis of how torts have developed, and what we discover in current tort rules,
is potentially explanatory.
At first glance it is very hard to understand Coleman’s charge that the
economic analysis of torts fails to articulate a causal mechanism for the evolution
of tort rules. Judges, so the theory goes, are economic actors, and their basic
rationality causes their decisions to move in the direction of great efficiency.
This account seems paradigmatically causal. Coleman, of course, understands all
of this, but discounts it, I believe, because of a fundamental disagreement about
the ultimate nature of law.
Posner is candidly a legal realist, although he prefers the title of
pragmatist.
Holmes argued that law is a prediction of what judges
will do when confronted with a specific set of facts. I
… now merely note its consistency with the more
conventional positivist view of the judge as rule
applier and, on occasion, rule modifier or creator. On
this view, law is the activity of licensed person, the
judges, rather than a body of concepts (rules,
principles, whatever). Judges employ discretion to
change rules, and discretion is not “principled,”
although it may be bounded by principles. Indeed, to
speak of “employing discretion” may be too grand.
Judges change rules, period. And in the end the law
is what the judges do with your case.30
And Coleman is an equally candid legal positivist, indeed, what he calls an
inclusive positivist.
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Law exists (is actual) when there is a rule of
recognition and rules valid under it that are generally
followed by the majority of the population.
Acceptance of the rule of recognition from the
internal point of by officials is a conceptual
requirement of the possibility of law; acceptance from
the internal point of view by the bulk of the populace
is neither a conceptual nor an efficiency
requirement.31
Both are quite knowledgeable and sophisticated jurisprudential theorists. But all
their carefully drawn distinctions and amendments do not change the basic fact
that for Posner law is essentially the behavior of judges, and for Coleman it is
essentially a system of rules. Realists admit that the behavior of judges creates
rules, at least ones that govern easy cases, while positivists admit that judges
(exercising discretion) create and change rules. But what is primary, what gets
at the analytic core of tort law, what gives us fundamental insight into what tort
law is, these answers by realists and the positivists appear to constitute genuine
rivals.
We are now in a position to address the charge that the economic analysis
cannot provide a plausible causal mechanism for the changes in tort rules in the
direction of increased efficiency. The economic lawyer asserts that most tort
rules, as with the common law generally, are simply the result of judicial
behavior. The economic lawyer sees the judge’s basic human nature the same
as any other normal human being – a rational utility maximizer. At a conscious
level the judge may be thinking about precedent, abstract issues of social justice,
or maybe nothing so grandiose at all. It doesn’t matter; the judge is hardwired,
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as are we all, to think economically. Increased economic efficiency is the result
of judges living in more complicated and knowledgeable times simply doing their
thing – making choices (we call them legal decisions) from the inevitable
perspective of economic actors. Or so says the economist.
IX.
The development of the common law of tort
has been marked by the opposition between two
major theories. The first holds that a plaintive should
be entitled, prima facie, to recover from a defendant
who has caused him harm only if the defendant
intended to harm the plaintiff or failed to take
reasonable steps to avoid inflicting the harm. The
alternative theory, that of strict liability, holds the
defendant prima facie liable for the harm caused
whether or not either of the further conditions
relating to negligence and intend is satisfied.
It is most likely that theories of strict liability
were dominant during the formative years of the
common law. But during the nineteenth century,
both in England and in this country, there was a
decided and express shift toward theories of
negligence.32
Epstein’s history is one of theories, not simply rules. Most scholars agree
that the development of tort rules of liability are more complicated than a simple
change from strict liability to negligence, but at the same time, they agree that
there has been a pronounced increase in the prominence and scope of the
negligence standard. Why has tort law developed in this way?
What is the best explanation of the development of tort law? Is it the
model of corrective justice, or that of economic efficiency? These questions only
make sense if we find a way of articulating the explanatory theories as genuinely
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rival accounts of the history of common law rules. We have already seen that
the most plausible reading of the law and economics treatments of torts is to see
them as functional explanations.

Many corrective justice interpretations of the

development of tort rules can also be seen as offering functional accounts. Let
us focus on the following why-question. Why has the history of tort rules moved
in the direction is has – in particular, why have we seen an ascendance of the
negligence rule?

The following two explanation now have, at least the

appearance of logical rivalry.
Te.

The function of the development of tort rules,
in particular the ascendancy of the negligence
rule, is greater efficiency in resource allocation.

Tj.

The function of the development of tort rules,
in particular the ascendancy of the negligence
rule, is to accommodate to changing conditions
and shared moral understanding our informed
sense of what is just and fair.

Even as so stated, a case can be made that these two functional accounts are
not truly rival.

We have seen how the economist can concede that at a

conscious level judges my think in terms of justice, but still be operating at a
more basic level as economic actors. Perhaps, in the final analysis, there really is
no theoretical dispute at all. It makes sense that the economic lawyer is simply
trying to explain something at a completely different level than the moral
philosopher or the corrective justice theorists. To some degree, that is exactly
what Posner and his colleagues have been claiming for more than a generation.
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I am disinclined to take this route, however.

There is a hint of false

modesty in the law and economics hypothesis. I side with Coleman here. The
efficiency model of torts is offered as an insight into the basic nature of tort law,
not some interesting footnote to general human, and therefore judicial, nature.
One way to see the genuinely rival nature of the two accounts is to take much
more seriously the language that judges use in their opinions, their scholarly
writing, and to themselves as the ponder their decisions. I agree with Dworkin
that jurisprudence must always incorporate both internal and external
explanations of legal phenomena.
We need a social theory of the law, but it must be
jurisprudential just for that reason. Theories that
ignore the structure of legal argument for supposedly
larger questions of history and society are therefore
perverse. They ignore questions about the internal
character of legal argument, so their explanations are
impoverished and defective, like innumerate histories
of mathematics, whether written in the language of
Hegel or of Skinner.33
To Dworkin’s “questions of history and society,” we can add economics, and to
his “written in the language of Hegel or Skinner,” we include Adam Smith or
Richard Posner. But here, of course, I show my true colors.

I am no legal

realist, though I agree that social, and indeed biological, factors play a significant
role in the decisions our judges make. Neither am I a positivist – though of
course legal rules matter. Ultimately, the sort of corrective justice account of
torts I want to defend demands the perspective of natural law.
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X.
Society was not invented by reasoning men. It
evolved as part of our nature. It is as much a
product of our genes as our bodies are.
To
understand it we must look inside our brains at the
instincts for creating and exploiting social bonds that
are there. We must also look at other animals to see
how the essentially competitive business of evolution
can sometimes give rise to cooperative instincts.34
Many theorists have speculated that the theistic presuppositions of
classical natural law could be conceptually divorced from a moral theory based
on an intimate connection between practical reasonableness, moral truth, and
ethical discovery. Much of traditional western moral theory can be seen in this
light, and in jurisprudence the work of Fuller, Dworkin, and even John Finnis,
argue that natural law need not depend on “a brooding omnipresence in the
sky.”35 I want to investigate the possibility of deriving a recognizable ancestor to
the classical natural law tradition from contemporary evolutionary biology.
Classical natural lawyers explain objective moral truth and knowledge, and
the behavioral inclination to what is morally required, in terms of God’s infinite
power, wisdom, and love.

This is exactly the sort of explanatory framework

proposed by eighteenth and early nineteenth century for accounting for the
manifest structure, order and purpose in the biological world. Darwin changed
the plausibility of that earlier explanation, not by disproving the existence of God,
nor even discrediting the design hypothesis per se.

Natural selection simply

offered a thoroughly secular and elegant account of biological order; one that
was not logically inconsistent with God’s existence or planning, but did not

22

depend on His existence one way or another. Secular natural law takes a similar
stand on matters theological. An omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect
creator may well exist, but His existence is not required for moral truth,
knowledge and inclination.
Intriguing evidence in game theory, animal ecology, and evolutionary
psychology all indicate that we all have behavioral phenotypes that lead us to
behave, think, and feel in generally the same way regardless of the culture we
find ourselves in – in short, that we have a species specific human nature.36 Part
of our human nature I suggest is a genetic predisposition to behave
cooperatively – i.e., morally – and to see and judge the behavior of others, as
well as ourselves, according to the standard of cooperation.
Biologically based moral realism was first speculated about, though not in
those terms of course, by Darwin. In the past one hundred and fifty years many
others have seen the attractions of such an approach to moral objectivity. At the
same time, though, critics have always vociferously assailed the approach. One
line of attack can by now, I hope, safely be dismissed. It is certainly true that
many early advocates of the biological approach have, consciously or
unconsciously, framed their arguments in racist and sexist terms.

Modern

evolutionary psychology, however, is overwhelmingly innocent of that ancient
charge.

Much more troubling, however, is an argument at the core of

evolutionary biology itself. An instinct to behave morally seems to imply a kind
of group selection that many biologists believe is, if not impossible, exceedingly
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rare and fragile in the natural world. The problem is easy enough to see. If we
are genetically inclined to cooperate with one another, this provides a very rich
medium for the evolution of cheaters. As we will see shortly, cooperating with
cooperators, bring reproductive advantages to all. But imagine a mutant strain
inclined to take advantage of others’ cooperation, fake it and pretend to be
cooperator, but ruthlessly cheat at every opportunity. Surely the genotype that
produces cheaters would thrive in a world of cooperators, and soon that world
would be dominated by cheaters.
We all know that there are people who behave in precisely this way, and
consistent with the biological speculation going on in this section, it’s reasonable
to suppose that an inclination to behave selfishly is also part of our genetic
heritage – indeed this is exactly what classical and neoclassical economics has
been saying since the time of Adam Smith. But, biologically based natural law
insists that the individual reproductive advantages of being a cooperator in a
world of fellow cooperators is so great that cooperative genotypes can be
evolutionarily stable in spite of the short term benefits of cheating. All of this is
biologically controversial, of course. Standard wisdom since the 1960s says it’s
close to impossible.37 But, recent advances in evolutionary theory including gene
selection, kin selection, and reciprocal altruism offer more attractive possibilities
for biological moral realism. And finally, a very recent and compelling line of
argument candidly

embraces

group selection

as

a viable

evolutionary

perspective, and explicitly includes moral thinking as its central example.38 In
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much the same way that secular natural law had to let the empirical facts from
cultural anthropology concerning cross-cultural values determine its fate, the
same is true of empirical facts in evolutionary biology. I remain confident that
evolutionary theory will vindicate this approach, but must confess that in spite of
promising proposals, much work remains to be done on this crucial aspect of the
theory.
XI.
All human societies have language. As far as we
know they always did; language was not invented by
some groups and spread to others like agriculture or
the alphabet. . . . The grammars of industrial societies
are no more complex than the grammars of huntergatherers. . . . Within societies, individual humans are
proficient language users regardless of intelligence,
social status, or level of education. Children are
fluent speakers of complex grammatical sentences by
the age of three, without benefit of formal instruction.
They are capable of inventing languages that are
more systematic than those they hear, showing
resemblances to languages that they have never
heard, and obey grammatical principles for which
there is no evidence in their environments.39
[T]he ability to use a natural language belongs more
to the study of human biology than human culture; it
is a topic like echolocation in bats or steropsis in
monkeys, not like writing or the wheel.40
Noam Chomsky used intentionally loaded language in describing the
biological approach to language.

He spoke of an innate, indeed candidly

Cartesian, knowledge of the underlying grammar of human natural languages.
Now, since the surface grammars of languages can vary in significant ways (one
need only think of native English speakers trying to master German as adults),
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the knowledge would have to be of a “deep structure,” abstract, and somehow
encoded in the human brain. Chomsky has, for fifty years, remained confident
that something like this deep structure would be discovered by linguists
analyzing natural languages, and cognitive scientists analyzing the human central
nervous system.
Secular natural law postulates an analogous underlying moral syntax to
most, if not all, culturally embodied moral systems – a deep-structure if you will,
to human moral thinking and perception. This hypothesis provides a starting
point for explaining a host of theoretical worries about absolute moral truth. The
ontological home for objective values is a behavioral and neural phenotype. Our
knowledge of them is a direct intuition, but not a philosophically mysterious one,
but similar to the immediate perception of correct grammar in Chomsky’s famous
piece of non-sense – “Colorless green ideas sleep ferociously.”

And there is

nothing motivationally peculiar in humans having an innate inclination to behave
morally. Indeed, on the evolutionary account it was precisely this behavioral
phenotype that was being selected for.
Certainly two defining properties of our species are our ability to use
language, and to develop culture.

The ability to adapt to social and

environmental circumstances in a time frame of years and decades, rather than
generations and eons, has given human beings a flexibility that is probably
unique in the biological world. It is no particular explanatory mystery, therefore,
that we see apparently great cultural diversity in human moral practices and
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perceptions.

Again, to push the analogy with language, human natural

languages exhibit great diversity in semantics and “surface-grammar.”

The

question, of course, is ultimately empirical. Can we discover an underlying deepstructure to human moral and legal practices?
XII.
There used to be a discipline called speculative
psychology. It wasn’t quite philosophy because it was
concerned with empirical theory construction. It
wasn’t quite psychology because it wasn’t an
empirical science. But it used the methods of both
philosophy and psychology because it was dedicated
to the notion that scientific theories should be both
conceptually disciplined and empirically constrained.41
Jerry Foder believed in 1975, and continues to believe, that something like
Chomsky’s universal grammar underlies, not just human natural language, but
much of human thought itself. Much of contemporary cognitive science, with
little acknowledgement of Fodor, can be seen as a sustained effort to test this
provocative and controversial hypothesis.
Secular natural law might be seen as a kind of speculative moral and legal
psychology. Very general and abstract models will be offered as candidates for
the deep structure of moral and legal thinking. It is almost impossible to overstress that these models will be intentionally over simple. They will provide, not
a complete representation of a legal system, let alone the detailed architecture of
human neural structure which constrains human normative and legal thinking.
One very intriguing abstract model comes from contemporary game
theory. Consider the classic prisoner’s dilemma.
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PRISONER’S DILEMMA
Player B
Cooperates

Cooperate

Fails to
Cooperate

3,3

0,5

5,0

1,1

Player A
Fails to Cooperate

Player A, whose payoff is indicated first, reasons that failing to cooperate
will maximize her utility, since if B cooperates, 5 is greater than 3, and if B fails
to cooperate, 1 is greater than 0. Failing to cooperate is A’s dominant strategy.
By exactly the same reasoning, it is also the dominant strategy for B. Hence,
both players if they are rational will fail to cooperate. The paradox, of course, is
that utility maximization has doomed each player to a clearly sub-optimal payoff;
both could receive 3 rather than 1, if they only cooperated with each other. A
and B need to find a way to mutually constrain their choices so that failing to
cooperate is not an option.
The best strategy in a single encounter prisoner’s dilemma game is not
necessarily the best in circumstances where there are repeated encounters. It
remains true, of course, that the non-cooperative play will always yield the
maximum payoff, but it appears that trust and cooperation can “evolve” through
a process of mutual reward and punishment. This was convincingly shown in a
fascinating line of research conducted by Robert Axelrod.42 He conducted
tournaments for computer programs where the contestants played “iterated”
prisoner’s dilemma games.

Each program played all others 200 times
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consecutively in the first tournament, and approximately 200 times in the
second. All of the submitted programs were required to play each other, as well
as a copy of themselves, and a program that randomly cooperated.

Both

tournaments had a clear winner charmingly named Tit-for-tat.
It is almost impossible to talk about Tit-for-tat without resorting to
anthropomorphic language – the program is “nice” because it cooperates on the
first play. It “rewards” cooperation by its opponent by continuing to cooperate
as long as its opponent cooperates. It “refuses to be exploited” by retaliating
with non-cooperation whenever the opponents fails to cooperate. And it “doesn’t
hold grudges,” “forgives,” and begins to cooperate again as soon as the
opponent does.

All of this is the product of amazingly simple programmed

instructions. Tit-for-tat cooperates on the first play, and on any subsequent play

n, it plays what the opponent played previously on n-1.
It is worth remembering that Tit-for-tat can never “win” any single contest
during the tournament.

The best it can do is when it plays a universally

cooperative program, or itself, is to end in a tie. Tit-for-tat could easily have lost
in Axelrod’s tournament.

All we need do is consider its fate had all of its

opponents been straightforward utility maximizers.

Had there been at least

eighty-one competing programs in the tournament, Tit-for-tat loses to all of
them. Furthermore, the relatively high number of opponents required for Tit-fortat’s loss is something of an artifact of the rules of the tournament. Had Tit-fortat not been allowed to play itself – and thereby rack up 600 points in this one
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round of the tournament – it would have lost to a field of non-cooperators of any
size.

Tit-for-tat’s fate is even more disappointing in a field of suckers who

cooperate no matter what, with one straightforward maximer.

Here it loses

dramatically, with the scale getting worse the higher number of naive
cooperators.
But, by far the most artificial aspect of Tit-for-tat’s remarkable success is a
taken for granted part of the prisoner’s dilemma. Every single play in Axelrod’s
tournament is perfectly transparent. Each opponent knows exactly what plays
have previously been made. There is no opportunity for covert cheating and
non-cooperation. There would be, of course, significantly less crime and noncooperation in the human social world, were every single one of our actions
knowable by anyone who was curious. Both happily (for those of us who value
personal privacy), and sadly (for efficient law enforcement and general
cooperation), however, the world of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma is not the
contingent world that humans find themselves operating in.
None of this is meant to disparage Tit-for-tat, or Axelrod’s methodology.
The strategy proved remarkably robust in the original tournaments. And, most
intriguing of all, it seems to be instantiated in some general form in the biological
world. Several examples have been discussed, most of them somewhat grisly.
Consider the case of:
vampire bats, which spend the day in hollow trees
and the night searching for large animals whose
blood they can quietly sip from small cuts
surreptitiously made in their skin. It is a precarious
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life, because a bat occasionally returns hungry,
having either failed to find an animal or been
prevented from drinking its fill from the wound. . . .
Luckily, however, for the bats, when they do get a
meal they can usually drink more than they
immediately need and the surplus can be donated to
another bat by regurgitating some blood. This is a
generous act, and the bats find themselves in a
prisoner’s dilemma . . . [The bats] seem to play Titfor-tat. A bat that has donated blood in the past will
receive blood from a previous donee; a bat that has
refused blood will be refused blood in turn.43
Natural selection has clearly stumbled on a strategy for ensuring cooperation
between vampire bats.

Might not a very similar strategy apply to humans?

Indeed, I am suggesting that Tit-for-tat articulates at some very basic, and of
course, grossly oversimplified level the deep-structure of interpersonal justice, at
least within the context of two-person prisoner’s dilemma interactions.
XIII.
The just person is fit for society because he has
internalized the idea of mutual benefit, so that in
choosing his course of action he gives primary
consideration to the prospect of realizing the cooperative outcome. If he is able to bring about, or
may reasonably expect to bring about, an outcome
that is both (nearly) fair and (nearly) optimal, then he
chooses to do so; only if he may not reasonably
expect this does he choose to maximize his own
utility.44
Most contemporary research on justice in moral philosophy, political
theory, and academic law focuses on social justice – the normative parameters
of the relationship between individuals and the state.

As important and

interesting as this work is, it glosses over a more basic notion of justice. Moral
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philosophy, and certainly the law, is ultimately concerned with what is right and
fair between any two parties (individuals, corporations, or the state and the
individual). Can a plausible standard of interpersonal justice be articulated in a
prisoner’s dilemma context?
David Gauthier has defended precisely such a theory. His starting point is
the rationality of mutual constraint – the fundamental lesson of the prisoner’s
dilemma.

It can be in one’s best interest to be constrained, even when the

precluded choice is in one’s short-term best interest. It is better for you and I to
be constrained to only cooperate, for if we are not constrained, if we behave has
“straightforward maximizers,” we will each earn considerably less than had we
cooperated in the first place. Gauthier puts a candidly normative spin on all this
game theory and rational behavior, arguing that the fundamental value that
emerges from contemplation of the prisoner’s dilemma is justice.
Just individuals, according to Gauthier, have internalized an entirely new
way of thinking. Rather than reasoning as rational decision theory would have it
– as utility or straightforward maxiimizers – they act from motives of constrained
maximization.
The constrained maximizer considers (i) whether the
outcome, should everyone do so, be nearly fair and
optimal, and (ii) whether the outcome she realistically
expects should she do so affords her greater utility
than universal non-co-operation.
If both these
conditions are satisfied she bases her action on the
joint strategy.45
We have here, I would argue, a nice abstract characterization of the winning
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strategy exhibited by Tit-for-tat, and the biological altruism we saw in the
vampire bats’ behavior. I believe it also comes as close as anything currently
available to articulating the neurological “deep structure” of human beings’
predisposition to behave cooperatively.
Gauthier is careful to note two very important considerations that are
essential in order for constrained maximization to be rational. First, the strategy
only makes sense if one is reasonably confident that one is interacting with
another constrained maximizer. If one’s opponent in the prisoner’s dilemma is a
straightforward maximizer, the rational play is of course non-cooperation – just
individuals are not stupid nor suckers.

Second, constrained maximization

requires a pre-reflective disposition to behave justly. If individuals calculate their
personal utility every time they interact with another, they will simply be
sophisticated straightforward maximizers.

And a society of straightforward

maximizers, however sophisticated, will be a Hobbesian state of nature,
constrained only perhaps by the forces of law and culture.
For Gauthier the move from being a straightforward maximizer, to a just
constrained maximizer is one of rationality, learning and culture.

I have no

quarrel with any of those factors, but suggest that normal human beings are
already programmed to see the world, and to behave, as constrained
maximizers. Living together as members of a social species necessitates mutual
cooperation, and it would be surprising indeed, if the forces of natural selection
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had not laid down such a normative deep-structure as a part of our speciesspecific human nature.
XIV.
[J]ustice in transactions between man and man is a
sort of equality indeed and injustice is a sort of
inequality. . . . [Therefore] the judge tries to equalize
things by means of the penalty, taking away the gain
of the assailant.46
The argument above did not argue that Tit-for-tat was the deep-structure
of justice or moral truth, but that it provided oversimplified model of what it
might be. Recognition of this point is crucial as we turn or attention to corrective
justice. I will be treating this ancient theory of legal justice as another candidate
for the deep-structure of biologically based moral realism, of secular natural law.
This model, however, will clearly be closer to the “surface” than Tit-for-tat.
Rather than focusing on game theory, computer tournaments, and totally
abstract and fictitious payoffs, we will be forced to consider real people engaged
in real disputes and instance of non-cooperation. My strategy, here, will mirror
that of Rawls in A Theory of Justice.47 I will argue that corrective justice much
better explains our considered intuitions about what the law should be doing,
and actual legal practice and common law evolution, than teleological theories
like utilitarianism and law as economics.
Aristotle’s view of corrective justice in the Nicomachean Ethics is candidly,
unapologetically, backward focused. Justice, and ultimately the purpose of law,
is to reinstitute cooperation between parties by restoring them, as far as is
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possible, to the conditions they found themselves in before the breakdown in
cooperation. It goes without saying, of course, that many circumstances will
require that the “equalization” be highly symbolic – prison time for a vehicular
manslaughter, or financial compensation for a wrongful death. Corrective justice
sees the basic atoms out of which the system is derived as individuals
encountering, cooperating and failing to cooperate, and wrongfully harming one
another.

The law is a mechanism superimposed on these individuals for

reestablishing cooperation when it has been threatened or broken down
completely.
Teleological theories of law, utilitarianism and law and economics, also
treat law as a mechanism for maintaining and enhancing social cooperation. It is
essentially forward-looking, and is an appropriate way of conceiving law when
one is concerned with designing good social policy. The questions that dominate
when law is understood teleologically concern future outcomes – what will the
effect of this legislation or ruling be for social cooperation in the future? Will
there be less crime?, more contracts?, fewer accidents?, greater economic
efficiency? The corrective justice/law and economics debate is often conducted
as if the scholar had to choose sides in a war of fundamental values. But as
John Rawls clear saw over fifty years ago, there are two concepts of legal rules,
or better, two ways of thinking about the law.48 We have already seen how
champions of each side in the contemporary debate have each conceded that
legal thinking is concerned with both corrective justice and economic efficiency.
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I am anxious to defend more than an academic compromise.

I fully

concede the insights that the economic study of law provides. And I further
concede that appeals court judges, not just professional policy makers, are
professionally required to take the future social costs and benefits of their
decisions into account when ruling in a “hard case.”49 Secular natural law insists,
nevertheless, that the corrective justice reading of legal justice is closer to our
biological deep-structure, and best accords with our considered intuitions about
what is right and fair in controversial legal circumstances. I will take a very small
step to defending that very large claim with two brief case studies.
VIII.
However problematic its current role in justice, there
is no doubt that vengeance is the original passion for
justice. The word justice in the Old Testament and in
Homer too virtually always refers to revenge.
Throughout most of history of the concept of justice
has always been far more concerned with the
punishment of crimes and the balancing of wrongs
than it has been with the fair distribution of goods
and services.50
The retributive theory of criminal punishment has always had the faint
odor of paradox. Why is not the state’s investment of time, money, and emotion
all for the sake of making a criminal’s life miserable an exercise in two wrongs
trying to make a right?

The fine, after all, or the prison sentence, or the

execution is hardly going to undo the previous wrong that criminal has already
produced. Now from a teleological perspective, of course, there is no mystery at
all. If the point of law, of legal punishment, is trying to most effectively manage
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future criminal behavior, the price paid for punishment may well more than
compensated for through the deterrence, or in the case of the criminal himself,
the prevention, of future crimes. But the retributivist seems left with little more
than vague metaphors of cosmic scales of justice being thrown out of balance,
and the function of punishment being an attempt to bring those scales back into
balance.
Our culture seems preoccupied with retribution. When there is a concern
with crime, the result seems always a “get tough” policy – three strikes,
mandatory sentencing, and the like. It seems to matter little that these policies
are hugely expensive, and that there is little empirical evidence that they
accomplish much. Nevertheless, ordinary citizens seem convinced that serious
crime demands serious legal punishment.

And although there seems little

consensus at all about what “serious punishment” should amount to, there
seems to be wide consensus, at least among my students, that the current
system is too soft on criminals.
I am not arguing for a second that I agree with my students, or the more
red neck of my fellow citizens. But I think that this widely held sentiment tells us
something about the objective soundness of the retributive instinct.

The

intuition that it would be unjust not to punish criminals is precisely what
biologically based secular natural law would lead us to expect. Our moral deepstructure was formed in ancestor species, long before the advent of complex
societies and sophisticated legal systems. Justice in this context was always a
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matter of cooperation between individuals.

Corrective justice quite correctly

focuses precisely on these kinds of interactions. Parties occasionally harm one
another (they act uncooperatively), and something must be done about it. The
focus is to the past. How can I (we?) do something about it? The criminal must
pay a kind of compensation. We must equalize the past transaction, so that
there can be cooperation in future ones. This is precisely what Tit-for-tat did
when opponents acted uncooperatively, the program “retaliated.” Once the debt
was paid, however, Tit-for-tat was willing to begin cooperating again.
One philosopher who has seen all of this very clearly is Robert Solomon.
His frustratingly ignored book, A Passion for Justice, argues that justice is as
much of a deep human emotion, as it is an intellectual or normative ideal.51
Solomon discusses the retributive theory in terms of vengeance, and categorizes
it as a negative emotion. But if we soften the language just a little bit, the
feeling of the objective rightness of retributive punishment is in no way a
negative emotion. According to secular natural law, it is a basic component of
human nature, and one that has clear adaptive value for our species.
IX.
We are satisfied that the character of the storm was
such that it would have been highly imprudent for the
master of the Reynolds to have attempted to leave
the dock or to have permitted his vessel to drift away
from it. . . . It is claimed by the respondent that it
was negligence to moor the boat at an exposed part
of the wharf, and to continue in that position after it
became apparent that the storm was to be more than
usually severe. We do not agree with this position.52
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I want to conclude our discussion of corrective justice by examining a very
famous case in the history of tort law.

In November of 1905 the steamship

Reynolds was docked in Duluth. As she finished discharging her cargo a severe
storm developed and the ship’s master, after failing to find a tug, kept his ship
moored to the dock, and weathered the storm.

Unfortunately, the ship was

constantly thrown against the dock, causing damages of as much as $1,200 to
the dock owner. He sued to recover the damages, and the trial court ruled in his
favor, awarding the plaintiffs $500. The defendant then appealed.
The case is such a puzzle to tort scholars because of the principle of
negligence in accident law. Simply causing damage to someone is almost never
sufficient grounds for recovery. My company makes a better mousetrap, and
your mousetrap factory goes belly up.

Certainly I have harmed you in a

significant way, but absent special, almost certainly illegal, circumstances, you
have no legitimate legal complaint against me. By 1905 American tort law had
firmly adopted the negligence principle. In order to recover, you must show that
I failed to take appropriate precautions, that I acted negligently in causing your
loss. Indeed, the plaintiffs claimed that the master had acted negligently by
leaving his steamship tightly lashed to the dock throughout the storm.
But the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected that argument.

Since the

Minnesota Supreme Court failed to see negligence on the master’s part, one
would have expected that the judgment would have been reversed. But this was
not the Court’s reasoning at all.
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This is not a case where life or property was
menaced by any object or thing belonging to the
plaintiffs, the destruction of which became necessary
to prevent the threatened disaster. Nor it is a case
where, because of the act of God, or unavoidable
accident, the infliction of the injury was beyond the
control of the defendant, but one where the
defendant prudently and advisedly availed itself of the
plaintiffs’ property for the purpose of preserving its
own more valuable property, and the plaintiffs are
entitled to compensation for the injury done.
Order affirmed.53
The question that has vexed tort scholars is why the plaintiffs are entitled to
compensation.
Economic law theorists can easily spin plausible account of the efficiency
of such a precedent.54 Corrective justice advocates have had a much harder
time, at least those wedded to the Aristotlean articulation:
it makes no difference whether a good man has
defrauded a bad man or a bad man a good one, nor
whether is is a good or bad man that has committed
adultery; the law looks only to the distinctive
character of the injury, and treats the parties as
equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being
wronged, and if one inflicted injury and the other has
received it.55
As Richard Posner has stressed for Aristotle’s concept of corrective justice, “the
duty to rectify is based not on the fact of injury alone but on the conjunction of
injury and wrongdoing.”56 And as we have seen, there is no wrongdoing on the
part of anyone.
Different scholars aligning themselves with the corrective justice camp
have suggested different ways to avoid the problem. Richard Epstein argues
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that the concept of negligence is morally otiose, and tort law should return to a
standard of strict liability.57 George Fletcher sees the ruling as correct because
of an inequality of risks the parties imposed on each other – the ship’s master
clearly put the dock owner at risk, but the inverse of the risk placing clearly does
not hold.58 Earnest Weinrib claims that the dispute should not have been seen
as a tort at all, but as a case of restitution.59 And Jules Coleman argues that
cases like Vincent show us that there is such a thing as wrongful loss that
corrective justice must redress even in the absence of wrong doing on the part
of the defendant.
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Secular natural law is neutral between these attempts to square standard
tort theory with the ruling in Vincent, though I confess to more comfort with
Coleman’s analysis. What I do want to argue, however, that the court’s ruling
makes, not only legal, but normative sense.

Through the fault of no one, a

seriously uncooperative situation between the ship’s owners, and the dock
owners’ had arisen. The court saw that this was unjust, and that correction was
required.

The intuition that there was an inequity or injustice is obvious to

anyone with a normal normative deep-structure.

And the court’s backward-

looking attempt at correction also makes sense from this perspective.
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